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Investigating seized devices within digital forensics gets more and more difﬁcult due to the
increasing amount of data. Hence, a common procedure uses automated ﬁle identiﬁcation
which reduces the amount of data an investigator has to look at by hand. Besides identifying exact duplicates, which is mostly solved using cryptographic hash functions, it is
also helpful to detect similar data by applying approximate matching.
Let x denote the number of digests in a database, then the lookup for a single similarity
digest has the complexity of O(x). In other words, the digest has to be compared against all
digests in the database. In contrast, cryptographic hash values are stored within binary
trees or hash tables and hence the lookup complexity of a single digest is O(log2(x)) or O(1),
respectively.
In this paper we present and evaluate a concept to extend existing approximate matching
algorithms, which reduces the lookup complexity from O(x) to O(1). Therefore, instead of
using multiple small Bloom ﬁlters (which is the common procedure), we demonstrate that
a single, huge Bloom ﬁlter has a far better performance. Our evaluation demonstrates that
current approximate matching algorithms are too slow (e.g., over 21 min to compare 4457
digests of a common ﬁle corpus against each other) while the improved version solves this
challenge within seconds. Studying the precision and recall rates shows that our approach
works as reliably as the original implementations. We obtain this beneﬁt by accuracy–the
comparison is now a ﬁle-against-set comparison and thus it is not possible to see which
ﬁle in the database is matched.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

Introduction
Handling hundreds of thousands of ﬁles is a major
challenge in today’s digital forensics. In order to cope with
this information overload, investigators often apply hash
functions for automated input identiﬁcation. A common
processing is known ﬁle ﬁltering which is quite simple:
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compute the hashes for all ﬁles on a target device and
compare them to a reference database. Depending on the
underlying database, ﬁles are either ﬁltered out (e.g., ﬁles of
the operating system) or ﬁltered in (e.g., known offensive
content). A very common database for ‘ﬁlter out’ data is the
National Software Reference Library (NSRL) (NIST
Information Technology Laboratory, 2013) maintained by
National Institute for Standards and Technologies (NIST).
Besides identifying exact duplicates, which is mostly
solved running cryptographic hash functions, it is also
necessary to cope with similar inputs (e.g., different versions of ﬁles), embedded objects (e.g., a JPG within a Word
document), and fragments (e.g., network packets) which is
commonly solved by approximate matching. The essential
idea is to complement the use of cryptographic hash

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2014.03.001
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functions to detect data objects with bytewise identical
representation with the capability to ﬁnd objects with
bytewise similar representations.
However, the lookup complexity of similarity digests
hamper the usage in the ﬁeld. Let x denote the amount of
digests in a database, then the naive lookup for a single
similarity digest has the complexity of O(x). In contrast,
cryptographic hash values can utilize binary trees or hash
tables and hence the lookup complexity is O(log2(x)) or
O(1), respectively. Assuming a set instead of a single digest,
the lookup complexity of similarity digests has a quadratic
runtime as it is solved by an all-against-all comparison
(brute-force).
Recently, at least one approximate matching algorithm
(ssdeep) was extended and now has a possibility of
indexing (Winter et al., in press). The authors showed an
improvement of a factor of almost 2000 which is ‘practical
speed’. However, analysis showed there are more powerful algorithms like sdhash (Roussev, 2011) and mrsh-v2
(Breitinger et al., 2013b) which output a different type of
similarity digest. While ssdeep produces a Base64
encoded ﬁngerprint, both other algorithms output Bloom
ﬁlter based hashes. In spite of all of them, the problem
remains.
In this paper we present and evaluate a concept for
approximate matching that allows a ﬁle-against-set comparison with a lookup complexity of O(1) for a single digest.
In contrast to general approximate matching, our approach
can only answer the question “does this set contain a
similar ﬁle to ﬁle A?” by
 yes, there is a similar ﬁle (but it cannot say which one),
or
 no, there is no similar ﬁle,
which is sufﬁcient in case of blacklisting. We obtain this
beneﬁt either at the cost of more hashing operations or
requiring a lot of main memory. Our evaluation demonstrates that the current procedures are too slow (e.g., over
21 min to compare 4457 digests of the t5-corpus3 against
each other) while our improved version solves this challenge within seconds. Analyzing the precision and recall
rates shows that our approach works as reliably as the
original implementations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces the necessary background and related work. The
problem description and solution overview is explained in
Sec. 3. All details about our concept are presented in Sec. 4.
The experimental results are given in Sec. 5. Sec. 6 concludes the paper.

Background & related work
This section explains the foundations and presents
related literature. First, we brieﬂy present the usage of hash
functions and approximate matching in digital forensics
which is followed by an introduction of Bloom ﬁlters. Sec.
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2.3 starts with an overview of approximate matching and
then introduces three concepts in more detail.
Hash functions and approximate matching in digital forensics
Currently a popular use case is to employ hashing
methods for known ﬁle ﬁltering of ﬁles which is quite simple: an investigator computes the hashes for all ﬁles on a
target device and compares them to a reference database.
Depending on the underlying database, ﬁles are either
ﬁltered out (e.g., ﬁles of the operating system) or ﬁltered in
(e.g., known offensive content). Files not found in the
database remain unclassiﬁed.
In case of ﬁlter out (a.k.a. whitelisting) the database
contains benign ﬁles, e.g., operating system ﬁles. We claim
that here an investigator is only interested in exact matches
and thus crypto hashes are the only choice. However, in
case of ﬁlter in (a.k.a. blacklisting) the database contains
illegal or suspicious inputs, e.g., child abuse or leaked
company secrets, and an investigator is also interested in
similar ﬁles. Note, approximate matching may operate on
the byte level or the semantic level (Breitinger et al., 2014).
Bloom ﬁlter
Bloom ﬁlters (Bloom, 1970) have a wide ﬁeld of applications, e.g., database applications (Mullin, 1990) or
network applications (Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2005)
and commonly used to represent elements of a ﬁnite set S.
A Bloom ﬁlter is an array of m bits initially all set to zero. In
order to ‘insert’ an element s ˛ S into the ﬁlter, k independent hash functions are needed where each hash
function h outputs a value between 0 and m  1. Next, s is
hashed by all hash functions h. To insert, the bits at the
positions h0(s), h1(s),.hk1(s) of the Bloom ﬁlter are set to
one.
0
0
To answer the question if s is in S, we compute h0(s ),
0
0
h1(s ), .hk1(s ) and analyze if the bits at the corresponding
0
positions in the Bloom ﬁlter are set to one. If this holds, s is
assumed to be in S, however, we may be wrong as the bits
may be set to one by different elements from S. Hence,
Bloom ﬁlters suffer from a non-trivial false positive rate.
Otherwise, if at least one bit is set to zero, we know with
certainty that s0 ;S. It is obvious that the false negative rate
is equal to zero.
In case of uniformly distributed data the probability that
a certain bit is set to one during the insertion of an element
is 1/m, i.e., the probability that a bit is still zero is 1  1/m.
After inserting n elements into the Bloom ﬁlter, the probability of a given bit position to be one is 1  (1  1/m)k$n. In
order to have a false positive, all k array positions need to be
set to one. Hence, the probability p for a false positive is

ik 
h
k
p ¼ 1  ð1  1=mÞk$n z 1  ekn=m :

(1)

Bytewise approximate matching
Approximate matching is a rather new area and probably had its breakthrough in digital forensics in 2006 with
an algorithm called context triggered piecewise hashing
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(CTPH) (see Sec. 2.3.1). Since then, a couple of algorithms
were presented. As this work focuses on Bloom ﬁlter based
approaches, we discuss those in Sec. 2.3.2. A complete
overview of different algorithms is given by Breitinger et al.
(2013a).
Basically approximate matching consists of two separate functions. First, tools run a feature extraction function
that extracts features or attributes from the input that
allow a compressed representation of the original object
(the exact proceeding depends on the implementation itself). Second, to compare two similarity digests, a similarity
function is used that normally outputs a score s which is
scaled to 0  s  100. Despite its range, this value is not
necessarily an estimate of percentage commonality between the compared objects but a level of conﬁdence. It is
meant to serve as a means to sort and ﬁlter the results.
ssdeep and the F2S2 software
The program ssdeep, also known as context triggered
piecewise hashing (CTPH, Kornblum (2006)) may be the
origin of approximate matching and is based on the spam
detection algorithm from Tridgell (2002–2009). The
implementation is open source and available online.4
The basic idea is very simple: split an input into chunks,
hash each chunk independently and concatenate the chunk
hashes to a ﬁnal similarity digest. In order to split an input
into chunks, the algorithm identiﬁes trigger points using a
rolling hash (a variation of the Adler-32 function5) which
considers the current context of seven bytes. Each chunk is
then given to the non-cryptographic hash function FNV
(Noll, 1994–2012). Instead of using the complete FNV hash,
CTPH only takes the least signiﬁcant 6 bits which is equal to
one Base64 character. Thus, two ﬁles are similar if they
have common chunks.
F2S2 was presented by Winter et al. (in press) and is an
extension for ssdeep that allows a faster similarity digest
comparison. F2S2 initializes a hash table that allows to
insert n-grams6 of the Base64 similarity digest. Each similarity digest is split into its n-grams and the ID to the corresponding ﬁle is put into its corresponding hash table
bucket. In order to lookup a similarity digest, the queried
digest is split into its n-grams. Next, the content of all
buckets are correlated in order to receive a set of possible
similar ﬁles. The ﬁnal decision is then made by using the
ssdeep comparison function.
The authors showed an improvement of a factor of
almost 2000 which is ‘practical speed’. For instance, they
decrease the time for verifying 195,186 ﬁles against a
database with 8,334,077 entries from 364 h to 13 min.
Bloom ﬁlter based approaches
This section presents two further prominent approaches
that outperform ssdeep with respect to precision & recall
(Roussev, 2011; Breitinger et al., 2013b, 2013c). In the
following, we provide a brief sketch of the feature
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extraction functions of sdhash and mrsh-v2, respectively;
a detailed description is beyond the scope of this paper.
Details about the similarity function and the similarity digests are given at the end of this section.
sdhash. This algorithm was proposed by Roussev (2010)
and attempts to pick characteristic features for each object that are unlikely to appear by chance in other objects,
which is the result from an empirical study. In the baseline
implementation, each feature is hashed with SHA-1
(Gallagher and Director, 1995) and inserted into a Bloom
ﬁlter (Bloom, 1970) where a feature is a sequence of 64
bytes. The similarity digest of the data object is a sequence
of 256-byte Bloom ﬁlters each representing approximately
10 KiB of the original data, on average.
Subsequently, a block-aligned version was developed
(Roussev, 2012), in which ﬁxed-size blocks (16 KiB by
default) are mapped to each 256-byte ﬁlter. Although the
two versions are compatible (the two versions of the digests can be meaningfully compared) we do not consider
the block-aligned version in our study as it requires additional parameters.
mrsh-v2. Breitinger and Baier (2013) propose a new algorithm that is based on ssdeep and multi-resolution similarity hashing (Roussev et al., 2007). Equal to ssdeep, the
algorithm divides an input into chunks using a rolling hash
where the estimated blocksize is 160 bytes. Each chunk is
then hashed by the 64-bit non-cryptographic hash function
FNV-1a (Noll, 1994–2012) and inserted into a Bloom ﬁlter
where a ﬁlter can store up to 160 chunks. Once a Bloom
ﬁlter reaches its capacity, a new one is created.
Note, in the following we are using the term feature as a
synonym for chunk.
Similarity digest. The similarity digest is very similar in both
cases. To insert a feature-hash into a m ¼ 2048 bit Bloom
ﬁlter (default size for both algorithms), the algorithms take
55 bits of the digest, split them into k ¼ 5 sub-hashes of 11
bits and set the corresponding bit. For instance, the subhash 000100011002 ¼ 8C16 ¼ 14010 sets bit 140 in the
Bloom ﬁlter. Both implementations have a maximum of
features per Bloom ﬁlter. If this limit is reached, a new
Bloom ﬁlter is created. Hence, the ﬁnal similarity digest is a
sequence of Bloom ﬁlters which is supposed to be
approximately 1.0% (mrsh-v2) or 1.6 %–2.6% (sdhash) of
the input length (compression ratio). To identify the similarity between two digests, all Bloom ﬁlters of ﬁngerprint A
are compared against all Bloom ﬁlters of similarity digest B
with respect to the Hamming distance as metric.7
Problem & solution
Currently, the problem is that it is not possible to order/
index Bloom ﬁlter digests. Thus, if a database contains x
digests a comparison of a given similarity digest against the
database requires an ‘against-all’ comparison. Extending
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n-grams a fragments of a longer sequence, e.g., 2-g of ABCD are AB, BC
and CD.
5
6

7
The original comparison is only sketched in this paper, as we replace
it in our new concept.
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this scenario means that comparing y similarity digests
against the same database corresponds to an all-against-all
comparison (bruteforce) which equals a quadratic runtime
complexity: O(xy).
Sec. 3.1 gives an overview of the overall idea. After that,
we brieﬂy repeat the terminology and deﬁnition, as it is
really important to have the abbreviations in mind.
Proceeding overview
The basic idea is to insert all features into a single Bloom
ﬁlter instead of having multiple ﬁlters as the lookup
complexity per ﬁlter is O(1). Thus, we overcome the
drawback of existing approaches and avoid the all-againstall comparison. To speed up the comparison decision we
additionally replace the classical comparison function by a
decision based on a sufﬁciently large number of common
substrings (later called longest run) as explained in Sec. 4.
More precisely, let SB and SD be two sets of digests.
Traditionally (using cryptographic hash functions) an
investigator possesses a database containing the elements
of SB (e.g., the blacklist). When he receives D (e.g., a seized
device), he hashes all ﬁles to SD and compares them against
SB. Note, the database SB can be precomputed and hence its
generation time is irrelevant.
Regarding our concept, there are two alternatives
depending on the underlying hardware:
1. Alternative one is identical to the traditional procedure.
That is, the Bloom ﬁlter is ﬁlled with the features of SB in
advance, that is we can neglect its generation time. Note,
using more than one Bloom ﬁlter will slow down the
process as they always have to be loaded into memory.
2. The second possibility assumes that SB does not ﬁt into
the Bloom ﬁlter, but SD does. In that case we turn the
work ﬂow upside down by ﬁlling the Bloom ﬁlter with SD
and compare SB against it.
The difference between these two procedures is the
overall time. While in traditional procedure (alternative
(1)) only SD needs to be processed, the second possibility
also has to hash SB as a precomputation step. In the
following (1) is denoted by best-case and (2) by worst-case.
The reason why alternative (2) might be necessary is
that it is not possible to load the Bloom ﬁlter for SB into
main memory. Hashing all ﬁles of a set into a single Bloom
ﬁlter requires a large Bloom ﬁlter which has to ﬁt into main
memory due to efﬁciency reasons. Thus, the limiting source
is the physically available RAM.
For instance, let us assume that jSBj ¼ 1500 GiB and
jSDj ¼ 200 GiB. As shown later, an everyday working station
with 8 GiB RAM cannot handle a Bloom ﬁlter of SB but of SD.
Therefore, we suggest creating a Bloom ﬁlter out of SD and
comparing all ﬁles of SB in a second step. It is obvious that
both sets have to be hashed – it is not possible to create the
database in advance.
To optimize (2), one may store a list of hash values of SB
instead of the ﬁles. Thus, the ﬁles are already hashed and
the overall proceeding is almost as fast as (1). In addition,
the compression is better as we only store a 256-bit (32
byte) hash for each 64-byte chunk.

Another downside of this approach is that we can
only say: yes, there is a similar ﬁle but not which ﬁle is
matched. In contrast, the traditional procedure allows a
statement: ﬁle A of the seized device matches ﬁle B in
the database. However, we argue that with respect to
ﬁlter in (blacklisting) this is sufﬁcient as an investigator
has to analyze matches anyway. In short, we only want
to know if the investigated ﬁle is similar to any ﬁle on
our set which is perfectly suited for blacklisting. In the
case a yes or no decision is insufﬁcient, this procedure
can be used as pre-proceeding–if a ﬁle is not found in the
Bloom ﬁlter it is deﬁnitely not a black listed ﬁle and can
be ignored.
Terminology & deﬁnition
This section repeats the notations from the previous
section which are necessary to understand all improvements and design decisions. Let m; k; n˛K.
feature describes a byte sequence which is hashed and
inserted into the Bloom ﬁlter. In case of mrsh-v2 this
equals a chunk of approximately 160 bytes and regarding
sdhash this is a sequence of exactly 64 bytes.
m denotes the Bloom ﬁlter size in bits.
k number of sub-hashes where each one sets a bit in the
Bloom ﬁlter.
n is the number of features inserted into a Bloom ﬁlter.
s denotes the ﬁle set size in MiB.
Design decisions and implementation
This section describes the design and code changes of
our approach. Sec. 4.1 shows the correlation between the
input ﬁle size and the number of features which are
inserted into the Bloom ﬁlter. The relevance of the feature
hash function is discussed in Sec. 4.2. Based on all these
ﬁndings, Sec. 4.3 explains the procedure to calculate the
best Bloom ﬁlter size. Sec. 4.4 introduces our match decision approach and the false positive rate which is the ﬁnal
parameter of our conﬁguration. After that, we describe the
result presentation in Sec. 4.5 and motivate the default
conﬁguration in Sec. 4.6. The ﬁnal part shows some details
about our reference implementation.
Correlation between elements (n) and ﬁle set size
In Eq. (1), n denotes the number of elements that are
inserted into a Bloom ﬁlter. Note, the number of elements is
different to the amount of ﬁles in the set but equal to the
number of features. Hence, this section analyzes the relation between n and ﬁle set size. Let s denote the ﬁle set size
in MiB.
sdhash inserts 192 features into a Bloom ﬁlter for every
approximately 10 KiB of the input ﬁle. Thus, n is calculated
by n ¼ s$220$192/(10$210) z s$214 where 220 is needed to
change from MiB to bytes.
In case of mrsh-v2, the implementation splits the input
in 160-byte features. Thus, n is calculated by n ¼ s$220/
160zs$213 where 220 converts MiB into bytes.
Since we adapted the feature size of mrsh-v2 in our
prototype to 64 bytes, we set n ¼ s$214 in the following.
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Feature hash function
To insert a feature into a Bloom ﬁlter of m bits length, k
bits are set which requires a hash value of the feature hash
function of at least k$log2(m) bits. More formally, having a
feature hash function of b bits, b  k$log2(m) which is
equivalent to m  2b/k.
The default implementations of sdhash and mrsh-v2
run 160-bit SHA-1 and the 64-bit FNV hash, respectively,
and set k ¼ 5. This comes at a maximum Bloom ﬁlter size of
2160/5 ¼ 232 bits ¼ 229 bytes is 512 MiB (sdhash) and 264/
5
¼ 212.8 bits ¼ 891 bytes (mrsh-v2).
Depending on the ﬁle set, this is insufﬁcient as we might
have a Bloom ﬁlter of several gigabytes (for instance when
mapping several terabytes into a Bloom ﬁlter). As a
consequence, both tools should implement 256-bit versions of the hashing algorithms. For instance, keeping k ¼ 5
and using a 256-bit hash function allows us to handle
Bloom ﬁlter sizes of 2256/5 ¼ 251.2 bits z 218 GiB. Alternatively, if we have an upper limit of the Bloom ﬁlter size, we
can increase k which reduces the false positive rate (see
Sec. 2.2). For instance, assuming a Bloom ﬁlter of
m ¼ 8 GiB ¼ 236 bits, k can be at most 256/36 ¼ 7.11. For the
remainder of this paper, we limit k to 5  k  7 where 5 is
the lower limit to minimize the chance for a false positive.
The upper limit is necessary to handle huge amounts data,
e.g., 1 TiB. If 7 is too small, one might change the hash
function to 512-bit or more.
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Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) relate the false positive probability p
for a single feature to the different parameters k, n, s, m. In
fact, we are less interested in the false positive rate for a
single feature but more for a fragment of a whole ﬁle
(which may consist of hundreds of thousands of features).
Thus, we have to extend Eq. (2) to a false positive probability of a fragment.
Let pf denote the false positive probability for a fragment. If we require rmin ˛ N consecutive false positive
features to be a false positive fragment, the false positive
probability for a fragment is pf ¼ prmin .
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Regarding Eq. (2), we can substitute p by rmin pf and
obtain

k$s$214
m ¼  
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ :
ln 1  k$rmin pf

(3)

Result presentation
Instead of printing a similarity score between two ﬁles,
our algorithm outputs.
file1.ppt: 163 of 2518 (longest run: 111)
which means that file1.ppt consists of 2518 features
in total where 163 match the underlying Bloom ﬁlter. The
longest run are 111 features which means that the algorithm identiﬁed 111 features in a row (which is larger then
rmin and therefore a match).
Sample setting

Deﬁning the Bloom ﬁlter size
Traditionally when dealing with Bloom ﬁlters, one tries
to optimize k for a given n, m, p setting. However, we have
limited 5  k  7 and discussed n. Thus, this section
identiﬁes a reasonable Bloom ﬁlter size m by transposing
Eq. (1) and substituting n in the last step by s$214 (see Sec.
4.1):


k
p ¼ 1  ekn=m
k$n
m ¼  
pﬃﬃﬃ
ln 1  k p

(2)

14

k$s$2
¼  
pﬃﬃﬃ :
ln 1  k p
Note, in our reference implementation, the Bloom ﬁlter
size has to be a power of two, i.e., m ¼ 2c, c ˛ N.
Match decision and false positives
In contrast to the classical approximate matching
comparison, we are only interested in a binary decision:
the currently processed ﬁle or a fragment of it is on the
blacklist or not. Therefore we adapt the classical comparison function of Bloom ﬁlters as follows: a fragment of
a given ﬁle is assumed to be part of the Bloom ﬁlter, if a
sufﬁciently large number of subsequent features is found
in the ﬁlter. We discuss in the following our approach to
identify a reasonable interpretation of what ‘sufﬁciently’
means.

In the following we brieﬂy discuss the default values. n
cannot be inﬂuenced as it is deﬁned by the set size. In case
of the false positive rate it is obvious that the smaller the
better. Since we do not expect more than 1 million ﬁles on a
device, we set pf ¼ 106 k is ﬁxed between 5 and 7 and we
decided for 5 as the smaller k the better the runtime
(feature hash length can be reduced; see Sec. 4.7.1). rmin is
by default 6.
For instance, let us assume s ¼ 200 GiB ¼ 25$213 MiB of
data, a false positive rate per ﬁle of pf ¼ 106, k ¼ 5 and
r ¼ 6:



5$ 25$213 $214
k$s$214
125$227

 ¼ 

m ¼  
¼

ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ﬃ
p
6
0:9968
ln 1  k$r pf
ln 1  1030
¼ 125:40$227 z234 bits
Thus, our procedure requires a Bloom ﬁlter size of 2 GiB.
Note, using the default setting, the Bloom ﬁlter size in
megabytes mmb can be estimated by mmb z s/100.
Implementation details
To verify our ﬁndings, we released a tool called mrshnet which is basically a modiﬁcation of the latest mrshv2 version. It can be downloaded from our website for
tests.8

8
http://wp1187348.server-he.de/z_downloads/tool.zip; anonymous for
review.
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The implementation is very simple and only has two
options:
- g generates the database and prints it to stdout. Usage:
./mrsh-net -g t5-corpus > dbFile
- i reads DB-FILE dbFile and compares DIR/FILE against it.
Usage: ./mrsh-net -i dbFile t5-corpus
The ﬁnal step is to compile it by running make mrshnet.
Feature hash function
The main change was the implementation of the FNV-1a
256 bit function which only consists of an XOR and the
multiplication with the prime 2168 þ 28 þ 0  63. As the
runtime efﬁciency is very important, the implementation
of the multiplication is ‘hardcoded’, i.e., it is not trivial to
change the prime number or extend it to 512 bit.
In order to speed up the implementation, one may
manipulate the FNV implementation in src/fnv.c. The
function mulWithPrime2 is responsible for the multiplication with the 256-bit prime. However, in case of a small
Bloom ﬁlter, we do not need the most signiﬁcant bits and
can remove them. For instance, setting the Bloom ﬁlter to
32 MiB and k ¼ 5, we only need log2(32$220$8)$5 ¼ 140 bits.
Thus, we can comment out lines 108–112, which then ignores the bits 160–255.
Settings
To adapt our prototype for a speciﬁc use case, the user
can change the following conﬁguration in header/
config.h:
SUBHASHES – amount of sub-hashes, parameter k
(default: 5).
MIN_RUN – minimal longest run, parameter r (default:
6).
BF_SIZE_IN_BYTES – Bloom ﬁlter size in bytes
(default: 33$554$432 ¼ 225 ¼ 32 MiB). It has to be a power
of 2.
There are more settings available. However, this is
ongoing research and we therefore do not recommend
changing them at this time.
Experimental results & assessment
This chapter mainly consists of three parts. First, we
analyze the general efﬁciency of different approaches. The
second part relates mrsh-net with the longest common
substring. The ﬁnal part compares mrsh-net and mrsh-v2
with each other.
All the presented results are based on the t5-corpus9
(Roussev, 2011), which contains 4457 ﬁles with a total
size of 1.78 GiB. The average ﬁle is z400 KiB and the ﬁle
type distribution is given in Table 2.
For our testing, we used the default conﬁguration of
mrsh-net, with k ¼ 5,rmin ¼ 6 and a Bloom ﬁlter size of 32
MiB. The blocksize, i.e., the approximate length of a feature,
is set to 64 bytes.

9

http://roussev.net/t5/.

Efﬁciency in general
Let SD denote the hashes of ﬁles from a device and let SB
denote database set (i.e., the blacklist). Traditionally the
proceeding requires to hash all ﬁles in SD and to compare
the hashes against an ‘existing database’ of SB ﬁles. Thus,
this section focuses the general properties of the different
approaches with respect to runtime efﬁciency and database
size (compression).
The results are given in Table 1 whereby the details are
discussed in the upcoming subsections. First, the
compression (row 1) is analyzed in Sec. 5.1.1. Next, Sec. 5.1.2
explains the runtime of the algorithms (rows 2–4). The last
section is an estimation for a large scale scenario to clarify
the impact of non-indexing.
Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the original
implementations of sdhash and mrsh-v2, respectively. In
column 3 we show the results for the worst case which
means that we do not have an underlying database (see Sec.
3.1). The following column also presents the worst case but
we modiﬁed mrsh-net based on the defaults in Sec. 4.7.2
(less bits of the FNV hash are considered). For completeness we included the results for F2S2 and SHA-1 in the last
two columns.
Database size
Let SB be the t5-corpus. Then, this section shows the size
of the corresponding database. In case sdhash, mrsh-v2,
F2S2 and SHA-1 the database is trivial as the database is
equal to the hashes.
Regarding mrsh-net there are two possibilities: worst
vs. best case. The worst case describes the scenario where
the database does not ﬁt in RAM and hence a hashdatabase as such does not exist. The investigator needs to
have the whole dataset available. In contrast, for the best
case where sufﬁcient RAM is available, the database is
simply the Bloom ﬁlter.
To conclude, the size of the databases of sdhash,
mrsh-v2 and mrsh-net (best) are in the same order of
magnitude and therefore only a weak assessment
criterion.
Experimental runtime efﬁciency
This section focuses on the time of hashing SD and
comparing it against the database of SB (generating the
database is neglected as it can be done in advance). As we
are interested in the runtime only, we use t5-corpus as
both SB and SD. Note, this results in 4457  4457
comparisons.10
The times are given in Table 1. Row 2 states that all algorithms perform well in hashing but are still slow
compared to SHA-1. The problem is shown in row 3 where
both Bloom ﬁlter approaches need an extremely long time
for the all-against-all comparison. The last row only sums
rows 2 and 3. Note, the ‘worst-columns’ constitute an
exception. Admittedly the comparison takes less then a
second, however there is no underlying database and thus

10
We run the tools by ./tool -c D B which compares both lists also
there are duplicate comparisons, i.e., A against B and B against A.
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Table 1
Database size and runtime efﬁciency of different algorithms.

Database size
Hashing
Comparing
Total
a

sdhash

mrsh-v2

mrsh-net worst

mrsh-net worst

mrsh-net best

F2S2

SHA-1

61.18 MiB
178 s
1281 s
1459 s

27.33 MiB
53 s
1259 s
1312 s

1.78 GiB
123 s
<1 sa
246 s

1.78 GiB
77 s
<1 sa
154 s

32 MiB
123 s
<1 s
123 s

3.69 MiB
221 s
<1 s
221 s

0.24 MiB
24 s
<1 s
24 s

The comparison itself need less than a second, however, in worst case B needs to be hashed.

Table 2
Number of ﬁles per ﬁle type: t5-corpus.

Table 3
Estimated runtime for a sample use case.

jpg

gif

doc

xls

ppt

html

pdf

txt

362

67

533

250

368

1093

1073

711

SB has to be processed. Therefore, row 4 contains two times
the hashing time (as D ¼ B).
One should keep in mind that the comparison has
quadratic complexity and thus increases enormously when
the number of ﬁles increases. In contrast, our new concept
has a linear runtime as it only needs to hash the ﬁles.
Impact on runtime in large scale forensics
Based on the ﬁndings from before, this section estimates
the efﬁciency for a real life scenario. More precisely, we
used the numbers from Table 1 and calculated the upcoming ones for a larger use case where we pick up the
example from Sec. 4.6 assuming 200 GiB of seized data and
a database of 1500 GiB11.
The results are given in Table 3. The estimated database
size is given in row 1 where in the best case mrsh-net
needs the less space, however, it should be kept in RAM.
Row 2 calculates the approximate hashing time by multiplying 200/1.78 (we have to process 200 GiB instead of 1.78
GiB). The last row assesses the comparison time. For
instance, sdhash needed 1281 s for comparing
1.78  1.78 ¼ 3.17 GiB of data. As this sample requires to
compare 200  1500 ¼ 300,000 GiB of data, we estimate
the overall time by 300,000/3.17$1281 s.
Again, there two possible scenarios with mrsh-net. In
the worst case, we hash the 200 GiB to the Bloom ﬁlter and
then process the 1500 GiB. As the comparison ‘costs
nothing’, mrsh-net has to hash 1700 GiB which is (1700/
1.78$123) s ¼ 117471 s (approx 32 h). In the best case we
have a powerful station that can hold the Bloom ﬁlter for
1500 GiB data in RAM (approximately 16 GiB of RAM are
needed). Thus, we only need to process the 200 GiB which
takes 227 min.
Precision & recall on base of the longest common substring
The current version of mrsh-net decides between
match and non-match based on the longest run. Hence, this
section focuses on the relation between mrsh-net and the
longest common substring. Due to the complexity, we build
our ground truth on the approximate longest common
substring which is brieﬂy described in the upcoming

11
The current NSRL of NIST contains about 2 TiB of unique data, hence
this a realistic size.

Database
size
Hashing
Comparing

sdhash

mrsh-v2

mrsh-net
worst

mrsh-net
best

49.79 GiB

22.22 GiB

1500 GiB

16 GiB

329 min
3.84 years

98 min
3.77 years

227 min
32.63 h

227 min
<1 min

subsection. Based on this assumed ground truth, we evaluate mrsh-net in Sec. 5.2.2.
Approximate longest common substring
The basic idea of the approximate longest common
substring metric (aLCS) is not to compare ﬁles byte by byte
but rather block by block. To identify the blocks, we utilize
the rolling hash from ssdeep and aim at having a block
size bs z 80 byte. If we set the blocks size smaller than 80,
the runtime efﬁciency decrease enormously (Note, a block
size of 1 equals the tradition longest common substring).
Instead of comparing blocks bytewise, each one is hashed
and compared using the 64-bit FNV-1a hash Noll (1994–
2012). Besides the hash value, the entropy and length for
each block is stored in the ﬁnal linear list called aLCSdigest.12
The output of the aLCS tool is a list which we denote as
ground truth. It contains both ﬁle names, the longest
common substring and the entropy for this sequence, e.g.,
file1 j file2 j 993 j 5.56
file2 j file3 j 11945 j 0.5
For instance, the ﬁrst line says that ﬁle1 and ﬁle2 have
an aLCS score of 993 bytes with an entropy of 5.56. The
second line shows a special case with a very low entropy
which could be an indicator that both ﬁles share mostly
zeros.
Precision & recall rates
To calculate the rates, we perform an all-against-all
comparison but neglect self-comparisons.13 Thus, we use
the following simpliﬁed notation:
mrsn(f,BF) compares ﬁle f against the Bloom ﬁlter BF and
returns the longest run.
aLCS(f,GT) returns the longest aLCS score for f in the
ground truth GT.

12
Note, this is ongoing research and currently in review. In the future
we will publish some more details about the evaluation and show that
this is a valid approximation.
13
Compare a ﬁle against itself will result in a perfect match.
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According to this, we deﬁne the true positive (TP), false
positive (FP), true negative (TN) and false negative (FN) as
follows:
TP: mrsn(f, BF)  rmin and aLCS(f, GT)  rmin$bs.
FP: mrsn(f, BF)  rmin and aLCS(f, GT) < rmin$bs.
TN: mrsn(f, BF) < rmin and aLCS(f, GT) < rmin$bs.
FN: mrsn(f, BF) < rmin and aLCS(f, GT)  rmin$bs.
where rmin$bs ¼ 6$64 ¼ 384 bytes.
Positives. Our comparison returned 2555 positive matches
with a true positive rate of 99.3% and a false positive of 0.7%.
Reviewing the false positives, all but one of the longest run
lr do not exceed 9 which means that they are very close to
our threshold.
In addition, we studied the distribution of the aLCS
scores daLCS relative to rmin$bs for the false positives where



aLCSðf ; GTÞ
daLCS ¼ 100  1 
384

; daLCS ˛N:

This shows how close the false positives are to the
threshold of 384. The results are given in Table 4. For
instance, over 60% have an aLCS score above 30% (¼269
bytes). To sum it up, although these are false positive, they
are close to the thresholds.
Next, we consider the relation between the longest run
and the aLCS score. In other words, we expect that the
longest run lr multiplied by the blocksize bs is greater or
equal the aLCS score, i.e., lr$bs  aLCS. According to that, we
adapt the conﬁguration from the beginning of this section
and changed rmin$bs to lr$bs. Thus, the new true positive
setting is:
TP: mrsn(f, BF)  rmin and aLCS(f, GT)lr$bs.
.
In this case, the detection rates worsen and fall down to
a true positive rate of 92.3% and a false positive rate of 7.7%.
Again, we consider the distribution for the aLCS scores in
Table 5. As we can see, over 75% vary by less or equal then
30% and we rate these results as still acceptable.
Negatives. Obviously the negatives are 4457  2555 ¼ 1902
which can be broken down into 77.1% true negatives and
22.9% false negatives. Having a closer look at this very high
false negatives, we observe that most aLCS matches are
based on low entropy sequences. In other words, the high

Table 4
Empirical probability distribution function (pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) for daLCS.
X

10

20

30

50

70

P{daLCS ¼ X}
P{daLCS  X}

0.1111
0.1111

0.2778
0.3889

0.2222
0.6111

0.1111
0.8889

0.0556
0.9444

Table 5
Empirical pdf & cdf for daLCS for the relation between longest run and aLCS
score.
X

10

30

50

70

100

P{daLCS ¼ X}
P{daLCS  X}

0.3214
0.3214

0.2296
0.7551

0.0714
0.9235

0.0051
0.9796

0.0051
1.0000

aLCS scores between some ﬁles are based on long runs of
zeros only, i.e., the entropy of the substring is e ¼ 0, or runs
of with a lot of zeros, e.g., the entropy of the substring is
0 < e < 3. Thus, Table 6 shows the impact of considering
aLCS sequences with a higher entropy.
Nevertheless, false negatives are not so much relevant.
For instance, with respect to blacklisting, these ﬁles remain
unclassiﬁed and an investigator has to analyze them
manually. Hence, false negatives are considered during a
further investigation.
Precision & recall rates compared to mrsh-v2
This section compares the relation between mrsh-v2
and mrsh-net. As both are based on the same procedure,
we expect that both implementations yield similar results.
In other words, comparing a ﬁle f against database BF, both
algorithms should either output a match or a non-match.
Thus, we deﬁne the following rates:
TP: mrsn(f, BF)  rmin and mrsh(f, BF)  1.
FP: mrsn(f, BF)rmin and mrsh(f, BF) ¼ 0.
TN: mrsn(f, BF)<rmin and mrsh(f, BF) ¼ 0.
FN: mrsn(f, BF)<rmin and mrsh(f, BF)  1.
Positives
Regarding the 2555 positive matches from mrsh-net,
92.1% are true positives and also identiﬁed by mrsh-v2.
The false positive rate is therefore at 7.9%. Comparing the
false positives against the aLCS showed that in fact only
3.6% (out of the 7.9%) are really false positive. On the other
side, Table 7 shows the distribution of the longest run for
the false positives. Most of them are close to the longest run
threshold 8.
To conclude, the results are slightly different, however,
the mrsh-net shows a ﬁner granularity as in fact these are
not false positives but true positives.
Negatives
The negatives yield a 61.8% true negative rate and a
38.2% false negative rate. Recall, false negative means that
mrsh-net does not identify a match while mrsh-v2 outputs a score greater 0. In other words, mrsh-v2 identiﬁes a
positive.
Thus, we ﬁrst compared the mrsh-v2 results against
aLCS. In fact, almost 7 0% percent of these matches are
based on ﬁles that share less than 384 bytes which have no
Table 6
Distribution of false negative with respect to entropy.
Entropy

>0

>1

>2

>3

TN
FN

78.5%
21.5%

82.3%
17.7%

86.4%
13.6%

91.2%
8.8%

Table 7
Empirical pdf & cdf for longest run lr.
X

10

15

20

30

50

P{lr ¼ X}
P{lr  X}

0.1095
0.4925

0.0200
0.7363

0.0200
0.7960

0.0200
0.9665

0.0050
0.9950
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false negatives for mrsh-net (our setting aims at having
more than 384 bytes). Regarding the remaining 30%, most
of the matches are again based on a low entropy, e.g., over
75% have e < 3.
To conclude, the algorithms do not coincide very much
with respect to negatives.
Conclusion
We have presented and evaluated a new approach to
efﬁciently decide about the similar membership of a ﬁle to
a given dataset and hence solve an important issue in the
context of approximate matching. Our approach decreases
the lookup complexity from O(x) to O(1), where x is the
number of ﬁles in the reference dataset. We released a
sample implementation for a practical evaluation. For the
well-known t5-corpus as evaluation ﬁle data set we were
able to solve the similar membership problem for all ﬁles in
the order of seconds (rather than minutes). The drawback is
that we are only able to decide about membership, but not
about the similarity to a certain ﬁle, which is sufﬁcient for
the important use case of blacklisting.
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